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ABSTRACT
A SIMULATION OF RACIAL TRANSITION IN NEIGHBORHOODS
by David Meiners
This paper presents a model which simulates racial transition in
neighborhoods. In the model there is one type of actors house-
holds, which are differentiated by race and income. The decisions
of when to move and where to move, in the face of changing racial
patterns, is the primary operation of the model. The households
make their decisions according to a utility function, by which they
evaluate the various alternatives.
The action of the model is carried out by a simple dynamic model
of the housing market. The market model consists of three parts.
The first, MOVERS, generates lists of households seeking different
housing and available sites. In the second part, CHOOSE, each
mover makes one choice of the tract to which he would like to move.
The third part, EXCHNG, rectifies the supply and demand in each
tract, makes the transactions, and adjusts the price of housing in
each tract for the next time period. Execution of these three
sections of the market model constitutes completion of one time
period.
A series of experiments are performed. These simulations test the
dependence of the racial transition process on a variety of different
household preference patterns and population distributions. Behavior
in these experiments is typical of actual patterns of transition.
Thesis Advisor: Aaron Fleisher
Title: Professor of Urban and Regional Studies
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1. Introduction
The distribution of race in American cities has an important
impact on many important social issues. Issues such as the provision
of decent housing for minorities, metropolitan-wide government, and
school busing are greatly affected, or even generated, by the racial
patterns in cities. The subject of this paper is the process by which
this pattern is created: the process of neighborhood racial transition.
This process is examined through the development and operation of a
simulation model.
There are several reasons for developing a formal model of racial
transition. First and most importantly, it is needed to reconcile
the stated preferences of both blacks and whites and the actual patterns
found in American cities. Surveys and interviews indicate that most
whites are indifferent or in favor of racially integrated housing;
blacks are even more favorably disposed. Yet empirical studies of
housing patterns in American cities indicate that most are heavily
segregated.2 Moreover, this pattern is not changing significantly.3
An obvious explanation is that people simply do not practice what they
preach. However, another explanation is possible: the system by which
an individual makes his housing choice, known as the housing market,
produces an aggregate result dissimilar to the real preferences of the
individual. A simulation model could analyze this explanation.
The model could also be used in other ways. The sensitivity of
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its output to its parameters indicates the stability of actual housing
patterns in the face of corresponding changes in actual conditions.
The model may also be used to evaluate the effects of a variety of
practical and impractical policy alternatives: price supports in
changing areas, the stability of forced integration after removal
of the force, housing or income subsidies for poor blacks, etc.
And finally, the model may be used to analyze some of the more con-
troversial questions surrounding the process of racial transition.
The most obvious of these are: what is the relation between property
values and racial change, and what is the meaning of tipping and when
does it occur.
The rest of this paper is divided into three main sections. The
first of these outlines previous simulation models of racial transi-
tion. The second describes in detail the model developed in this study.
And the last describes some experiments performed on the model.
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2. Survey of Previous Models of Racial Transition
There have been five previous simulations of racial transition,
each with its own approach. Despite their differences, they all have
certain fundamental features in common. First, all are dynamic: each
traces the spatial pattern of race through time. Secondly, whether
explicitly stated or not, all the model are behavioral; each defines
a decision rule by which the actors make their choices. Thirdly, they
all define basic units of space and time, though the size of the units
varies greatly. In the rest of this chapter, the main features of
each of the models will be described.
The first simulation model of racial transition was developed by
Morrill. Space, in this case the city of Seattle, is divided into
blocks; the temporal unit is one year. Racial transition is viewed
as the expansion and diffusion of the Negro ghetto. The process is
driven by significant increases in the Negro population caused by
migration from outside the metropolitan area. Eachyear these migrants,
plus 20% of the existing Negro population..move. The destinations of these
moversis determined by a probablity field, which weights the likelihood
of a move to a particular block by the distance of the move. Negro
migrants are assumed to originate in the center of the Negro ghetto.
Random numbers are generated and compared to the probability of each
move as defined by the probability field; the random numbers determine
the moves of the Negroes. If a block already has Negro residents then
all moves generated by the random numbers are made. But if the block
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had been previously all whitef the move is not made. Instead, a contact
is registered. Once a block has been contacted a specified number of
times, all future moves to that block are allowed to occur. The number
of contacts required depends on the median property value of the block:
the higher the value, the more contacts required. The procedure of
generating movers and assigning them according to a probability distribu-
tion is repeated each time cycle.
By manipulating the number of contacts required, this simple
model can replicate with good accuracy the general pattern of ghetto
expansion, though for a few blocks major errors existed. Several comments
concerning the decision rules of the model are in order. First, blacks
and whites are viewed as fundamentally different types of actors. Second,
blacks base their locational decision solely on the distance of the
move; they do not consider any features of potential destinations other
than location. Recognizing the importance of these other features,
Morrill mechanisticly varies the required number of contacts by property
values to capture some of the impact of block features on the probability
of choice. Third, the rule for whites, though never explicitly stated,
makes him simply a deserter; for each black which chooses a particular
block, there is a white who immediately leaves the same block. In short,
the model may be able to reproduce the pattern of race in cities by
using these decision rules, but it offers little insight into the motives of
the individuals which produce the pattern.
A similar model was later developed by Hansell and Clark.5 Census
tracts were the spacial unit and the time interval was two years.
The actors were white and black households. As in Morrill's model,
a probability field is computed, but the decisions rules which pro-
duce it are more complicated* The probability thata black family
moves to a given tract depends on the distance of the move, the
value of dwellings in the destination tract, and the number of black
households already in the tract. The value of dwelling units is
included by ranking the tract according to the median value of its
units. For tracts ranking in the lowest two quartiles all blacks
who eventually chooseit are allowed to enter. In the next quartile,
only 50% of the blacks choosing it are allowed to move in. In the
highest quartile, no blacks are allowed to enter. The behavior of
whites is also more complicated; they are no longer simple deserters9
but will resist black incursion. This resistance depends on the strength
of non-racial ethnicity in the tract. If 60% of the tract is foreign
born or the children of foreign born, none of the black choosers are
allowed in; if the tract is more than 30% foreign, only half of the
blacks picking the tract get in; and if the tract is less than 30%
foreign, no resistance is offered to black incursion. Once blacks
successfully enter the tract all resistance ceases and whites desert
as in Morrill's model.
The model was run using data from Milwaukee and was able to
reproduce the pattern of race with about the same accuracy as Morrill's
model. The model is noteworthy in two ways. First it increases the
role of white households: they can offer resistance to black incursion.
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However, their motives as movers remain fundamentally different than
the motives of blacks. Secondly, though the method for including tract
characteristics is contrived, it does seem preferable to Morrill's
and should be regarded as a step in the right direction.
A different and more complicated approach has been taken by
Freeman and Sunshine.6 Space is a single neighborhood composed of
240 houses arranged in blocks. The time interval is not specified,
but is clearly quite short, probably no longer than one month. The
actors are households which are specified by race, income, "aquisitive-
ness" score, and prejudice score. Households act as buyers and sellers
of housing.
Each time period a specified number of households leave the neigh-
borhood and a number of blacks and whites consider moving into the neigh-
borhood. The seller attempts to maximize his selling price, subject to
his level of aquisitiveness. The higher the aquisitiveness, the higher
the seller's initial asking price and the longer he is willing to wait
to sell at a high price. The buyer will choose the lowest priced unit
because all the units are identical. However, if the lowest price is
greater than a specified fraction of the buyer's income, he chooses to
go elsewhere and does not enter the neighborhood. The time cycle con-
sists of letting each potential mover determine if he will enter the
neighborhood.
Race entersthe model in two ways: first, discrimination can block
the entrance of blacks; and second, whites will be less willing to enter
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and more willing to leave as the percentage of blacks grows. For a
black family to enter the neighborhood several hurdles must be passed:
the black buyer must be shown the house, the white owner must be
willing to sell to a black, and the black family, assuming that it
does buy the house, must be willing to stay in the neighborhood in
the face of white animosity. Each of these hurdles is defined as
a probabilistic event; the probability that a black passes these
hurdles depends on the prejudice score of the seller, the aquisitihe-
ness of the owner, the percentage of the neighborhood which is black,
and the number of homes for sale in the neighborhood. Whites also
react to race: for each white family there is a probability that it
will move away. The probability is a function of the family's preju-
dice score and the percent black in the neighborhood. Moreover,
there is also a probability that each of the potential white buyers
decides not to move to the neighborhood because of the presence of
blacks.
Operation of the model consists of letting buyers and sellers
attempt to complete transactions, with the outcome of the hurdles
decided by a stream of random numbers. By varying the many parameters
of the model, its authors- were able to reproduce a variety of neigh-
borhood types: a neighborhood which blacks could not penetrate, one
which became sharply divided into white and black sections, one which
became eventually all black, and one in which the blacks and whites
mixed freely.
10
Even the simplified description of the model presented here
should indicate that the model is very complex. Because of its
complexity some of the more important and fundamental features of
the model may not be clear and deserve special note. Most importantly,
this model is an attempt to model neighborhood transition as a market
process. This achievementhowever, is greatly diminished by the
size of the market it models. The sample runs consisted of a mere
240 houses, nor because of its detailed nature and the amount of
computations required, would it be practical to expand its scope
greatly. The result is a tiny housing market model which is isolated
from the rest of the city. The neighborhood stands alone; its surround-
ings have no impact. The basic demand for housing, both black
and white, is constant; blacks and whites are not allowed to consider
alternative neighborhoods. Despite the limitations of the market
mechanism, its inculsion in the model is a major achievement. It
is also important to note that the black and white households are
really the same type of actors, both are households seeking to find
new housing and to dispose of the old. They differ only in the mannerin
which race affects their choices. This model is able, unlike the
previous two, to consider the effect of racial change on property
values; this is clearly an advancement over previous efforts.
Another market model has been developed by Vandell.7 Space
consists of indivisible cells, each with a specified set of dwelling
traits: market value and a level of housing service; and resident
traits: income, job location, and color. The time unit is variable.
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The black and white populations are initially in an equilibrium; each
race lives in its own segregated neighborhoods (groupings of cells).
The equilibrium is then upset by a disturbance, such as the migration
of sizable numbers of blacks to the city. This migration produces
a rise in the cost of housing in the black area. In the case of
renters, this clearly decreasessatisfaction with living in the ghetto.
A number of blacks will decide to leave the ghetto and seek housing
in the surrounding white areas. (Determinationn of which blacks move
is made by ranking them by a function of their income and their
present ratio of housing expenditures to income. Three restrictions
are placed on the destinations of these movers. First, the blacks
are not allowed to move to sites which are further than their present
home from their place of work. Second, the new home must cost at least
as much as the old. And third, the chosen home must maximize the
exchange agent% profit.
This exchange agent is the first appearance of an actor which
is not a housing consumer. He can obtain a profit because whites
are willing to sell their homes below the true market value if the
home is adjacent to black cells. The resident of a white cell examines
the surrounding eight cells and he drops his selling price an amount
depending on the number of black cells around him. (This procedure
is referred to as the cellular autamata technique. ) The agent is thus
able to buy low and then sell the unit to blacks at the true market
value. The process continues until the vacancy rate in the ghetto
is higher than the rate in all the other neighborhoods, or until no
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black is both able and willing to move. Once this new equilibrium
is established the clock may be advanced to the time of the next
disturbance.
The important feature of this model, like the Freeman-Sunshine
model, is the inclusion of a market process. Hence it is able to
trace changes in the vacancy rate and market values in areas of
racial transition. However, the model pre-determines that values
in areas changing from white to black must drop. Moreover the size
of the price drop and the strength of white resistance to change
do not depend on the availability of alternative similar housing.
A unique feature of the model is the exchange agent. The exchange
agent is important for he determines the direction of ghetto expan-
sion. Though real estate speculators of this type undoubtedly play
a role in racial transition, the universality and centrality of
this role is questionable.
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Finally, there is the simple yet insightful model of Schelling.
He has developed a dynamic model of the type of segregation which
arises from individual choice. The technique may be applied to any
spatial segregation, but his ultimate concern is housing segregation
by race. The effort was motivated by the observation that individual
preferences and goals do not always correspond to the collective results.
Spatially, the model consists of an array of cells which can be
occupied by one of two groups or allowed to stand vacant. Individuals
move because they are dissatisfied with the (racial) composition of
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the surrounding cells. Each operates according to the following
decision rule: examine a specified set of the surrounding cells,
if the percentage of these cells occupied by the other group is
greater than a specified number, then the individual decides to move.
He will move to the nearest vacant cell which has acceptable surround-
ings. This rule is based on distaste for the other group; another
rule was considered which was based on the desire to be with a
specified number of one's own kind. (These rule are slightly different
because some cells are vacant.) All individuals are continually
considered for moving until all are happy with their location, when the
system reaches equilibrium.
Numerous runs were made varying the size of the neighborhood,
the relative sizes of the populations of the two groups, and the
tolerance for the other group (or the need forone's own group).
The results are striking; even for high tolerances, the equilibrium
patterns are quite segregated. For example, if both groups require
only two of the surrounding eight cells to be occupied by his own
group, there is significant clustering of groups. If one group is
very tolerant and less numerous, and the more numerous group demands
majority status in its surroundings, the process eventually forces the
minority group into well-defined ghetto areas.
This simple but abstract model makes its point well: the rules
of micro behavior need not bear any resemblance to the macro pattern
it produces. A group of individuals, each "looking out for himself,"
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may produce an aggregate result which none would either expect or
especially desire. The implications for the patterns of race in
American cities are clear. However, because of its abstractness,
interpretation of this model as a model of racial transition in cit-
ies is neither wisenor intended by its author. But it indicates
quite forcefully the potential value of models of racial transition.
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3.1 An Overview of the Model
The model developed in this study has been formulated with the
view that there are several characteristics which a model of racial
transition should possess. First, the model must be explicitly
behavioral, with reasonable decision rules. It was decided there-
fore, that blacks and whites would make their decisions in the same
manner. Households of both races make their housing decisions according
to a utility function. Differences in their decisions result from
differences in the parameters of the utility function, but blacks and
whites are fundamentally the same type of actors.
Secondly, the model should be simple. Racial transition in
neighborhoods is clearly a complicated process. It should also be
noted that this complexity has hindered analysis. The approach of
this study has been to pull out of the complexity a few key features,
or universals, and examine their relationships. Only two features
of households, race and income, and two features of housing, a measure
of housing service and the price of this service, have been included in
the model. As a further simplification, the model deals with owner
occupied units, though the model could be easily extended to include
renters. Moreover, other potential actors, such as bankers and realtors
do not appear in the model. Though there are serious dangers in limiting
the complexity of the model, there are also important advantages. Most
importantly, a simple model eases analysis of the relations between
those features included in the model, relations which a more complicated
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and comprehensive model might miss. Moreover, as will be seen
later, there are many interesting and important questions which can
be examined with a simple model.
Thirdly, the nature of the subject necessitates a dynamic
model. Important transitory phenomena do not appear in a model
which outputs only final conditions or produces an equilibrium sol-
ution. For example, the behavior of market values during the period
of transition (an important and controversial question) can only be
examined with a dynamic model.
Fourthly, the model should be versatile. Hopefully, versatility
is obtained in several ways. The spatial dimension is variable; it
could be as small as a block or as large as a group of census tracts.
Moreover, the size of the spatial units in a single simulation could
vary greatly. For example, very high detail could be obtained in
present areas of racial transition and their immediate surroundings,
while in areas distant from change which will clearly remain white, the
unit could be census tracts. Unlike most of the previous models, a
rectangular grid arrangement of the spatial units is not required.
The model is also versatile because it provides a systematic proce-
dure for the creation of new decision rules. New decision rules can
be added simply by appending terms to the utility function. (Most
of the previous models, on the other hand, would require major alter-
ations in their structure.)
A detailed description of the model follows.
17
3.2 The Actors and Their Decision Rules
Fundamentally, the model simulates the behavior of housing
consumers and the housing market; the only actors in the model are
housing consumers. These consumers are differentiated only by race,
incomeand tract of residence; no other features are known about the
actors. Thus the population of the model consists of a three dimen-
sional array:
POPRYT = number of households by race (R),
income (Y), and tract (T).
All individuals of the same race, income and tract are identical;
or in other words, their decision rules are the same. Households
make their decisions according to their evaluation of various alter-
natives. The evaluations are performed by a utility function which
may be associated with each household. Unlike most of the other models,
black and white actors are really the same: both simply evaluate
housing alternatives. Of course their evaluations are different,
but this is a result of preference differences and is expressed by
different forms of their utility functions.
The utility function states that the utility of a given housing
choice is a function of the income and race of the household and three
characteristics of the housing unit: 1) its quantity of housing
service, 2) the price of one unit of its housing service, and 3) the
racial composition of the unit's tract. Symbolically:
U = U(Y,R,q,p,%)
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Y = income of household
R = race of household
q = quantity of housing service
p = price of one service unit
% = per cent black in the tract (T).
The utility function makes use of a well-known concept of hous-
ing analysis: the concept of the quantity of housing service.9
It collapses all the numerous features of a housing unit, such as
rooms, land, plumbing, condition, age, etc., into the one dimensional
quantity of housing service, which crudely measures the quality of
the unit. Other things being equal, a rich household will consume
more service units than a poor household. It should also be noted
that a small but well-kept dwelling may provide more service than
a large but poorly maintained unit. If housing services were free,
all households would try to consume more. But a price does exist
and the more the household spends on housing, the less money it
has for other goods; eventually greater consumption of housing reduces
utility. In short, housing is viewed as a normal good of utility
theory in classical microeconomics. Market value is simply the
price of one service unit times the quantity of service the unit
provides.
The conceptualization of market value as a quantity times a price
is valuable because it permits clear analysis of changes in market
value due solely to the actions of the market (changes in price)
and formally excludes value changes resulting from changes in the
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condition of the unit (changes in its quantity of housing service).
(In the model, the quantity of housing services provided by each
unit does not change.) Thus when a price changes in the model, it
should be clear that the unit does not change, but only the market's
evaluation of the fixed bundle of services it provides.
The dependence of the utility function on the per cent black
represents an important effect of the neighborhood on utility. It
is a fundamental assumption of the model that households evaluate
alternatives partially on the basis of the color of their neighbors.
The percentage entered into the utility function may be the simple
percentage of the tract's population which is black, or it may bea
more complicated function. For example, it could also include a
weighted average of the percentage in the surrounding tracts. Or
since housing choices are long term decisions, the percentage may
be an expected percentage, a projection of the per cent black at same
time in the future.
As stated previously all housing units in a given tract are
identical (they all supply the same number of service units).
Hence the prevailing market price will be the same for all units
in the same tract; since they are identical there is no reason to pay
more for one than the other. Thus utility can be written as:
U = U(R,Y,T)
where for each tract T, there is a specified
q(T),p(T), and %(T).
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3.3 The Market Model
The action of the model is simply a simulation of the metro-
politan housing market. The market model consists of three separate
stages: 1) MOVERS: the decision to move, the decision to enter the
housing market; 2) CHOOSE: the comparison of alternative housing
choices and the selection of the move destination; 3) EXCHNG: the
completion of the transaction, the purchase of the chosen unit.
MOVERS. MOVERS generates a list of households, by income, race,
and location, who decide to move in the present time period. It
also places the homes of the movers on the market. The movers are
divided into two groups. First, there are those who move for reasons
other than the changing racial composition of the area. These house-
holds, black and white, move for a variety of reasons which are not
specified by the model: a new job, a change in income, a change in
family size, etc. These diverse factors combine to produce an aggre-
gate movement rate which is exogenous to the model and depends only on
income. The number of movers of unspecified motivation, by race,
income, and origin tract, is given by:
umRYT = Y . POPRYT
where mR = number of movers of unspecified motiva-
tion by race (R), income (Y), and origin
tract (T),
r = fraction of households which move each time
period for reasons other than racial change
by income (Y),
POP = number of households by race(R), income(Y),
RYT and tract (T).
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Secondly, there are households which move as a reaction to the
changing racial composition of the tract; they are responding to
negative neighborhood externalities. Since utility depends on the
racial composition, the effect of changing racial patterns can be
measured through the utility function. The rate of racially motivated
movement is a function of the fractional decrease in utility caused
by changes in the racial composition of the tract. The fractional
decrease in utility is given by:
U - U
A _RYT RYT
RYT ~ o
URYT
where RYT = fraction change in utility because of race
by R,Y,T
URYT = present level of utility by R,Y,T
URYT = level of utility if independent of race.
The quantity ARYT measures the loss of utility because of race and
the rate of racially motivated movement depends on ARYTI
eRYT = f(&RYT)
where PRYT = fraction of households which move each time
period because of race by R,Y,T
The specific form of f(A RYT) is unspecified, but it is clear that the
larger the utility loss, the greater the rate of movement ( >,
It must also be pointed out that f(A RYT) is really a function of
an ordinal scale, since classical utility functions produce ordinal
values (ranked, but with no measure of the separation of the rankings).
This usage is discussed in the appendix.
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The number of racially motivated movers may be computed:
rmRYT RYT RYT
where rm = number of racially motivated movers
by RY,T.
Finally, it is possible to compute the total number of movers
by race (R), income (Y), and origin tract (T):
MOV = m, + m
RYT u-RYT rRYT
There is also a list of movers whose tract of origin is unspecified.
Placed on this list are the net number of migrants to the metropolitan
area and the net number of internal household formations. These house-
holds may be viewed as originating in a special tract, with designation
T=O, which has an undefined spatial location. Thus,
MOVRYO 
=G RY
where MOVRYO = number of movers of unspecified origin
(formally originating in tract T=0) by
race (R) and income(Y).
GRY = net change in the total number of households
in the entire region by R and Ye
The array GRRY is exogenous to the model; therefore, the model does
not determine the total metropolitan population by race and income, but
only distributes it within the region. The following relation must
hold:
t PopRYT t-1 POPRYT + GRRYT T
where POP = total number of households by RY in the
T t BYT region at the present time.
Ft POPRYT = total number of households by RY in the
T last time period.
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MOVERS also sets the number of houses on sale in each:
FST = MOVRYT + VACT + NEWT
where FST = total number for sale in tract T
MOVRYT = number of movers by R,Y,T
VAC = number of vacant units in T; these are
units unsold from the last time period
NEW = new units just constructed in T.
This equation merely expresses the three ways units may appear on the
market in any time periodt 1) the dwellings of the movers axe placed
on sale; 2) units unsold in the last time period remain on sale;
3) newly constructed units go on sale. The equation also points
out that all the units in the tract are identical, whether old or
newly constructed. The array NEWT is exogenous to the model.
The arrays MOVRYT and FST are the sole output of MOVERS; MOVERS
has generated a list of movers and a list of dwellings to which the
movers can go.
CHOOSE. In CHOOSE each mover is allowed to pick a destination
of his move, though the actual moves will still not be completed.
Three factors are postulated as affecting the choice of destination.
First, the choice depends on the utility of the tract, This dependence
will attract whites to white areas and blacks to black areas. It will
also attract wealthy movers to tracts of high housing quality and poor
movers to low quality housing4 The strengths of these attractions
depend on the form of the utility functions. Each race and income
group will tend to move to the most useful housing.
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Secondly, the likelihood thata tract is chosen depends on the
number of units for sale in the tract. For example, consider two
identical tracts with identical housing. One tract has two houses
for sale and the other has only one. Also each house will have an
equal likelihood of being chosen (since the units are completely
indistinguishable). The likelihood that a tract is chosen is simply
the sum of the likelihoods of choosing each of the houses for sale
in the tract; hence the tract with two units is twice as likely
to be chosen as the onewith only one unit. In other words, the
likelihood of choosing a tract depends on the number of units for
sale because households actually choose houses and not tracts.
And finally, the likelihood of a move depends on the distance
10
of the move. This reflects informational factors: the further
the available unit is from the mover, the less likely the mover
will learn of it. Households will also generally prefer shorter
moves to lessen the strain on established ties, such as church, clubs,
and friendships.
By combining these three factors the likelihood of the move
from one tract to another for each racial and income group can be
computed:
LRYT T' = H(URY T' FST, D(d TT,)
where L RYTT, = likelihood of a move from tract T to tract
T' for household of race (R) and income (Y)
URYTI = utility of tract T' to household of R,Y.
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FS, T= number of units for sale in T'
d = distance from center (center of gravity)
of tract T to center of tract T'.
The functional form of H(URYT,) is critical for it relates the
likelihood of a choice with the utility of the choice. (Once
again the model requires a function of an ordinal variable; see
the Appendix.) Whatever, its precise form, it is clear that as
URYT, increasesso should H(URYT, ): the greater the utility of
a move, the more likely the move, other things being equal. The
opposite is true for D(d TT,): as d TT increases, D(d TT,) decreases.
By this point each mover, by race, income, and origin, has
examined all the tracts and has computed the relative likelihood
of choosing each tract. The probability that the mover chooses each
tract is simply the normalized likelihood of choosing the tract:
PRYT T' LRYT T'
FLRYT T'
where P RYTT, = probability that a mover of race (R),
income (Y), and origin (T) chooses to
move to tract T'.
The sum of these probabilities over T', for each R,Y,T class, is one;
this is equivalent to forcing each mover to make a choice of one and
only one destination tract. (Those movers choosing to leave the metro-
politan area are accounted for in the net growth array, GRRY.) Movers
make their choices proportionally to PRYT T
CHORYT T, = MOVRYT PRYTT
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where CHORYTT, number of choosersof race (R), income
(Y), choosing to move from T to T'.
The total number choosing each tract, by race and income, is simply
the sum of CHORYTT, over T, the origin tracts:
CHORYT, 
= ECHORYTT'
T
where CHORYT, number of choosers of tract T' by R,Y.
(It should be pointed out that the movers with unspecified origins,
MOVRYO, are treated in precisely the same manner. The only special
feature for these movers is that D(dTT,) for T"0 is always unity,
which formally states that their likelihoods do not depend on the
distance of the move.) The array CHORYT, is the sole output of the
second section of the market.
EXCHNG. The final section is EXCHNG and it actually comletes
the transactions. It also adjusts the prices of housing. By the
beginning of EXCHNG movers have been generated, units have been placed
on the market, and movers have chosen their destinations. However,
the actual transactions, the changing of ownership, have not taken
place. The total number of choosers in each tract is compared with
the number of units available in the tract:
NT,= ZCHORYT, 
- FST'
R,Y
Two cases are possible: 1) N L: 0 and NT, > 0. In case I there are
more units available that there are choosers. Hence all the choosers
may be assigned to their chosen destinations:
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BUY RYT = CHORYT'
where BUY RYT,= number of choosers who are successful
(able to purchase their chosen unit),
by race (R), income (Y), and tract (T').
Unless ZCHORYT = FST, , some of the units will be left unsold.
R,Y
These units are designated as "vacant."
VACT, = -NT, = FST, - CHO RYT for NT' 0
R,Y
Designation of the unit as vacant does not necessarily mean that the
unit is actually unoccupied. Vacant units in the model are units
which are not occupied by a household which intends to stay in the
unit. It may in fact still be occupied by the household which decided
to move away from it, since he may be required to sell his old unit
before he is able to move into his new one. On the other hand, the
seller may have the financial resources (downpayment) to move before
his old dwelling is sold; in this case the unit would be unoccupied.
The model does not attempt to distinguish between these two situations.
Conversely, a unit which is empty for a time between the departure
of the old resident and the arrival of the new does not appear on
the vacant list, provided it does have a definite buyer (it was chosen
by household from BUYRYT, list). Vacant units are units which do not
have buyers; vacant units are units whose owner does not wish to
live there any longer. In this sense, the model simulates housing
transactions (the buying and selling of units by owner-occupants)
and not actual moves. No doubt moves will follow the transactions,
but there will be some time lags.
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This rather peculiar definition of vacancies not only simplifies
the model of the market, but it also is most appropriate for this
analysis: the great symptom of racial transition in not unoccupied
units, but a high percentage of homes displaying the "for sale"
sign on their lawn. In some ways a unit with a resident who intends
to move as soon as possible has the same effect on the neighborhood
as an unoccupied unit; in either case the future status of the
unit is unknown to the neighbors. To repeat, vacant units are units
remaining unsold after completion of the present time period.
In case 2 there are more choosers than units available and no
units will be classified as vacant. Instead a number of choosers,
equal to NT,, will be unsuccessful: they do not obtain the unit
which they had chosen in this round. Choosers are proportionally
rejected: if 10% of all choosers must be rejected, then 10% of each
racial and income class is rejected. (This assumes that sellers
do not discriminate against choosers; sellers are not concerned with
the race of the chooser.) Formally,
NT, CH
YRYT, = RYT' ~ CHORYT' RYT'
R,Y
where BUY RYT, = number of choosers who are successful
in tract T' by race (R) and income (Y).
CHORYT, = number of choosers of tract T' by RY.
NT, = total number of rejected chooser of T'.
It should be noted that the following necessary conditions hold
RYT BUY , = XHORYT' ~ CHO * RYT')R,Y RYR RYT
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hence BUYRYT, = CHORYT' 
- T'
R,Y R,Y
and 
- BUY RYT = FST'
RqY
Those who have failed in their choice are placed on the unspecified
movers list for the next time period (MOVRYO ) and will continue to
search for housing in the next time period. Placing those rejected
on this list implies that they will broaden their search and will
examine the entire market with full intensity: D(dOT, ) = 1 for all T'.
Finally, the transactions can take place; those leaving turn
their units over to those entering:
t+1 RYT' M t RYT, + BUYRYT, - MOVRYT'
where POP RYT = population-in tract T' by race (R)
and income (Y) in the next time period.
tPOPRYT, = population in T' by R,Y in presenttime period.
It should be noted that these procedures account for all movers.
Conservation of households is maintained through the market process;
nobody is lost or disappears in the search for housing. Of course
population does change, but only through the net growth array, GRRYI
Zt+1POPRYT' = t POPRYT, + GRRYT T
One final task remains before the market process is completed:
the adjustment of prices. In each tract there is an established price
of a unit of housing service; it is at this price that sellers offer
their units and it is this price that buyers enter into their utility
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function. This price will now change in response to new conditions
in the tract: if units remain unsold after transactions the price
will fall; if choosers were rejected the price will rise. This price
adjustment is critical for it affects the choices which will be made
in the next time period. A lower price will increase the tract's
utility to all movers and if the racial compostition had not changed,
the number of choosers will be increased. On the other hand, an
increased price will tend to yield fewer choosers in the next period.
Let
NT, = CHORYT, - FST'
R,Y
and 'T , = f(NT,/FST')
where CHO RYT = number of choosers of T' by R,Y
FST, = number of units offered in T' at
beginning of the market.
then t+19T' t ,T' . (1+ 4T'
where t+1PT, = price of a unit of housing service in
tract T' in the next time period.
tpT = price of a unit of housing service in
tract T' in the present period.
Thus the market price of housing is established in each tract. These
relations state that the change in price is a function of the fractional
excess or shortage of offered units. When NT,( 0, JTC 0; when NT'>O'
T, ) 0. The price adjustment will tend to limit the concentration of
vacancies in any one area; the lower prices in high vacancy areas will
attract more choosers in the next time period.
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After the prices have been adjusted, the simulation of the present
time period is completeed. The clock may be advanced to the next time
period and the market process can begin again. A flow chart of the
process is presented on the next page.
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3.4 Limitations of the Model
Before proceeding further it is necessary to point out some
of the limitations of the model which result from its fundamental
simplicity. Most importantly, actual housing decisions are far
more complicated than decisions in the model. Obviously there are
characteristics other than income and race which affect the decisions
of when to move and where to move; without doubt the age and educa-
tion of the household head, the household size, non-racial ethnicity,
and many other factors affect decisions. Moreover, the model does
not clearly distinguish between willingness to moveand ability to
move. Each time period a number of racially motivated movers are
generated; all of these households try to complete a transaction.
The decision to move is not affected by the price of their present
unit. In fact, many households in racially changing areas do not
decide to move because they do not believe that can sell their home
at its "true" value. As a result households which are willing to
move are unable to move because they cannot get enough for the
old home* The model may therefore over-estimate rates of racial change.
In like manner, housing is more complicated than the one
dimensional quality of housing service: the unit's age, its history
of maintenance, its school district, its accessibility, and many of
its detailed features will affect the unit's attractiveness to the
different types of movers.
Another set of simplifications appear in the market process.
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Important actors, such as lenders, real estate investors, and realtors,
do not play an active role in the model market. Moreover, the model
does not consider the role of a home as a major capital asset. The
decision rule for movers only considers the annual payment owners of
housing must make (quantity of service units times the price of a service
unit) and does consider the effect the downpayment has on the kind of
unit which is purchased. The real market also exerts forces on the
housing stock. First, the location and nature of new construction,
though subject to various constraints, does respond to market changes.
In the model both the location, type, and quantity of new construction
is exogenous. Secondly, housing for many households, particularly
poor households, is provided through the conversion process: units
are allowed to deteriorate until their market value is low enot4
for poorer households to afford. In terms of the modelconversion
of a unit consists of a change in the number of service units the
dwelling provides (a change in q). However, changes in q are not
allowed in the model.
These limitations are significant. Clearly, the ability of the
model, when applied to real data, to duplicate actual racial patterns
or to predict future changes is questionable. But this is not to say
that the model is useless. As noted in the Introduction, a simple model
is still of value. In a topic as important as racial transition in
neighborhoods, even this limited value is significant.
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4.1 Operation of the Model
Operation of the model requires the specification of a variety
of arrays, parameters, and functions. The following arrays describe
the initial characteristics of the model region:
POPRYT number of households in each tract by
race and income.
GRRY = net regional growth by race and income.
ry= fraction of households moving each time
period for reasons other than race by
income.
Y = income of each income class.
q = number of housing service units of dwellingsin tract T.
p T =price of unit of housing service in tract T.
xT = x-coordinate of center of gravity of tract T.
yT= y-coordinate of center of gravity of tract T.
VACT = initial vacancies in tract T.
NEWT - number of new dwellings constructed in T each
time period.
Besides the arrays, there are several functions which must be set:
%(T) perceived per cent black for tract T. (This
may be the actual per cent black in T, or it
may be a more complicated function, including
for example, a projection of what the percen-
tage will be or the per cent in adjacent tracts.
U(R,Y,T) = utility of choice of tract T for household of
race (R) and income (Y).
f(A RYT) = rate of racially motivated movement as function of
RTi the fractional loss of utility because
of race.
D(dTT,) = dependence of likelihood of move on distance.
H(U(R,Y,T)) = dependence of likelihood of move on utilty.
d(N T/FST) = fraction response of price to market condition
in tract T.
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Besides, the utility function makes use of the parameters 0(Y; the
use of the parameters o(y will be discussed later. These arrays and
functions are the only data required by the model.
The next section will describe a series of experiments per-
formed with the model.
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4.2. Experiments Performed with the Model
A series of simulation runs were made using data generated
specifically for the model; no data derived from a real city was
used. A model city was created which consists of 16 tracts. The
tracts were arranged in a 4 x4 grid; this was done only for display
purposes and is not required by the model. (The model will accept
any arrangement of tracts of any size.) The population is divided
into two races(black and white) and three income classes (low, middle,
and high). The time period in all the simulations was 6 months and
all runs covered 20 periods or 10 years. Unless otherwise specifically
noted, the following values were used:
PPRYT tract white black
low mid high low mid high
1 0 300 1500 0 0 0
2 0 1550 1500 0 0 0
3 0 1500 1500 0 0 0
4 200 1500 1000 0 0 0
5 0 0 2000 0 0 0
6 0 1000 1000 0 500 1000
7 1000 1000 1000 500 500 0
8 2000 1000 0 1000 200 0
9 0 3000 0 0 0 0
10 500 1000 500 200 800 100
11 3000 1000 0 50 0 0
12 0 0 0 2000 2000 0
13 200 1500 300 0 0 0
14 0 0 2000 0 0 0
15 100 1500 180 100 2000 300
16 0 0 0 4000 1000 0
GRRY low mid high
white 100 100 100
black 300 500 300
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low mid high
Y 8000 15000 25000
ry .15 -08 .08
location initialtract T (x,y) VACT
1 5000 1.00 (1,1) 0
2 5000 1.00 (2,1) 0
3 5000 1.00 (3,1) 0
4 3750 1-00 (4,1) 0
5 5000 1.00 (1,2) 0
6 3750 1-00 (2,2) 0
7 3500 1.00 (3,2) 0
8 3000 1.00 (4,2) 0
9 3750 1-00 (1,3) 0
10 4000 1.00 (2,3) 0
11 3000 1.00 (3,3) 0
12 2800 1.00 (4,3) 0
13 3500 1.00 (1,4) 0
14 5000 1.00 (2,4) 0
15 3750 1-00 (3,4) 0
16 2800 1.00 (4,4) 0
The values of qT and pT were were set with respect to each other
and the income levels of the households. The price of a unit of
housing service was initially set at $1.00. Census data indicates
that households spendroughly 25% of their income on housing (less
at higher incomes and more at lower). Thus if incomes range from
$8000 to $25,000, housing expenditures would tend to range from
$2750 to $5000. Since the price of a unit of service is $1.00,
this means that bundles of housing services from 2750 to 5000 units
are appropriate.
The utility function used in all the experiments is a variation
of the standard Cobb-Douglass function of microeconomics.11
U(R Y,T) = (Y- q T T q R
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The first factor represents the utility derived from non-housing
expenditures. The housing expenditures are qT T; therefore it
has Y - qTPT left over for all other expenditures. The second
term (qT '07) represents the utility derived from the consumption
of housing. The last term (fR(M) measures the effect of the
racial composition of the tract on its utility. This is the only
term of the utility function which is different for whites and blacks.
The racial effect is not described as an analytic function
but as a table functions its form will be described in each
experiment.
The Cobb-Douglass form has one major advantage for this model.
Through the parameter QY it is possible to specify the percentage of
its income that a household must spend on housing in order to maximize
its utility. In all experiments:
low mid high
Y .65 -75 .80
Households maximize when they spend 1-0(Y of their income on housing.
The parameter 0(Y controls which type of housing each income group
is directed to. The major drawback of the Cobb-Douglass form is that
it is rather insensitive to different combinations of income and housing.
Disregarding the racial term, the utility of all the housing bundles
for a given household will vary by only 2%-3%. This is not a serious
problem because the insensitivity can be compensated by making H(U(R,Y,T))
very sensitive to U(R,YT). Thus it is possible to make the small
differences in utility have a large effect on the likelihoods of moves.
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Two different forms of H(U(R,Y,T)) were used in the experiment.
Both are very sensitive to changes in utility, but the first one is more
sensitive than the second; households using the first function are
more particular in choosing a house to meet their needs as determined
by their race and income.
-, --- --- ---
0
,7uP .9R .qu0 V
The dependency of likelihood on distance (D(dTT,) ) was not varied.
The form of D(dTT,) was:
-Tp
0 3
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q
The distance axis is in the same units as the grid coordinates;
thus tracts at (3,1) and (1,1) are two units apart. The actual size
of these distance units is unspecified, but is of the order of one mile.
Shown below are the final two functions which must be specified:
the rate of movement because of race as a function of the fractional
utility loss A(PRYT)l and the response of prices to the fractional
excess or shortage of units, J(NT/FST)*
Unless otherwise noted, the decision to move (computation of pY
uses the present per cent black in the tract. The decision to enter a
tract, as determined by H(U) is based on a percentage which is an
average of the per cent black in the tract and the mean per cent black
in those tracts less than 1.1 units away. Thus the potential buyer
considers the four adjacent tracts when computing his likelihoods.
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EXPERIMENT #1t Base run.
Besides the specifications described in the preceeding section,
the following forms of f R(M were used:
7
0 a 7rS 0.
The solid curve in each graph is the function entered into the utilty
function for each race. The broken curve is H(f(%)) and displays the
effect of race on behavior much more clearly. H(f(%)) measures the
change in the likelihood of a move because of race, holding all other
factors constant. For example, consider a mover faced with two alter-
natives of identical housing (same qT and pT the same distance away,
but in tracts of different racial composition. The relative likelihood
of each move is simple the value of H(f(%)) in each tract. In the
curves above, a white is not very likely to move to a tract which
is more than 20% black. Blacks on the other hand, are more willing
to accept inter-racial housing, but they are unlikely to enter a tract
which is almost exclusively white. This experiment uses the strong form
of H(U); likelihoods depend strongly on utility.
The results of this experiment are striking and typical of racial
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transition. In the ten years of the simulation, the black population
has nearly tripled and the black area has extended into many formerly
all-white areas. The solidly black area was concentrated into two
tracts (12 and 16), but after ten years nine tractswere almost ex-
clusively black. In fact, by the end of the run only one tract (1)
had not begun the process of racial transition. In black areas, and
those in the process of becoming black, there are significant numbers
of units remaining unsold (vacant). This results from the rapid flight
of whites which brings more units to the market than the growing black
population is able to absorb. Thus blacks can obtain housing at a
reduced price, while whites pay more for segregated housing.
It is important to note the effect of racial transition on parti-
cular tracts. Tract I is the only tract which blacks do not enter.
Initially, the high rate of white flight from tracts near the initial
concentration of blacks forces up prices in the outlying white areas
(1,2,3,4,5, and 9). Howeverthe continued heavy construction in these
tracts eases supply and prices drop in tract 1 and the others. But
after 15 time periods (7i years) racial transition has begun in all
the tracts except 1. Thus a new white flight begins from these out-
lying tracts and is aimed soley at tract 1. In response, prices
rise in tract 1, despite the continued construction. Tract 1 is the
last haven for whites.
Tracts 2,3,4,5,9, and 13 display, by time period 20,different phases
of the racial transition process. Typical features can be seen in each:
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a rise in vacancies as neighboring tracts begin to change, declining
prices, and an increasingly steep rate of change from white to black.
The entire transition processs occurs in tract 14. At the begin-
ning of the simulation the tract is all-white, with high quality units
and high income residents. At first very few units going on the mar-
ket are not sold (low vacancies) and as whites are fleeing the first
neighborhoods to change, prices rise. A trace appearance of blacks
after one year has little immediate effect. However, after 2j years
two neighboring tracts (10 and 15) have built up substantial black
populations and this affects the willingness of whites to move to tract
14. After 3f years 22% of the units cannot be sold and prices are
dropping. At this point the number of black entrants begins to sharply
increase; the tract has now clearly entered the transition process.
At the fburth year of the simulation the tract is 3o black; during
the next three years this figure rises to 81%. In this same period
the mean income of the tract's residents falls from $23,000 to
$15,000.Thus housing in the tract is not only filtering over (from
white to black), but also filtering down (from upper to middle income
groups). It should be noted that prices remain quite low during the
entire transition process.
It is important to note that prices do not rise after transition
is completed. The tract's price does conform to the prices in other
black tracts; prices are low in all black tracts. By the final year
tract 14 is part of the ghetto.
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EXPERIMENT #2 A Lessening of Preferences
This experiment is identical to the previous one, except that
households are slightly less particular: the dependence of the like-
lihood of a move does not depend as heavily on the utility of the
move. Households are more likely to pick a less than perfect match of
housing service units and income, and more willing to live in racially
mixed tracts.
I-
A 4
~~4-1
SD 7!r
As might be expected the greater tolerances slowed the ratesof
racial transition. For example, after 10 years tract 4 was 81% black
in experiment 1, while in this experiment it had only reached 26%.
The rapid transition in tract 14 was delayed four years in this
simulation. The number of vacant units was generally lower. Inter-
estingly, the slightly greater tolerances made it possible for blacks
to enter all the tracts; even tract I was 2% black by time period 20.
The response of whites to black incursions was slowed in this
runs whites did not flee as rapidly. Also, blacks continued to enter
the region at the same rate. These two facts combined to produce an
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important price effect. The decreased white flight drastically re-
duced the number of units becoming available for blacks. This tighter
market for blacks forced prices to remain near their initial values
in black areas. In transition areas, such as tract 11, prices fall
as the changeover gathers momentum, but once the tract approaches
100% blackprices begin to rise.
EXPERIMENT #3 More Demanding Blacks
This simulation is identical to the first, except that blacks
are now less willing to accept minority status. The likelihood that
a black will choose a tract does not become large until the expected
per cent black (as stated earlier, this considers the per cent in adja-
cent tracts) is 40%-50%- This change did not have a major effect on
the outcomes. Rates of change were slowed because transtion has a
harder time getting started, but the final outcomes were essentially
the same. (See figures on the next page.)
EXPERIMENT #4 Reduced Population Growth &nd New Construction
This experiment uses the same preferences as Experiment #1, but
the rates of population growth and new construction have been reduced.
The following values were used:
GRRY low mid high
white 50 175 125
black 150 300 100
NEWT tract 1 2 3 4 5 9 all others
200 200 100 100 100 200 0
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Not surprisingly, the results are quite different than the base
case results. The significant reduction in black population growth
produces seven tracts which do not undergo transition (there was only
one such tract in Experiment #1). The vacancy rates tend to be lower.
This indicates a reduced disturbance in the housing market; fewer
units going on sale will tend to leave fewer units unsold after the
market process is completed in a given time period.
EXPERIMENT #5 Reduced Population Growth and Increased Tolerances
Experiment #5 replicates Expermiment #2; only the population
growth has been reduced. GRRY and NEWT are the same as in the previous
experiment* Like Experiment #4, fewer tracts underwent transition.
However, unlike any of the previous experiments, including #4 which
had the same population and construction changes, tract 14 did not
begin to change from white to black. After 10 years tract 14 remained
99% white- (See graph on the next page.) At least in one tract,
a slight change in attitudes made a significant difference. Surprising-
ly, an increase in tolerance stopped significant black incursion into
tract 14 (at least the incursion was delayed many years to a point
beyond the simulation period). It appears that some threshold pheno-
menon is operating. (These results and their relation to tipping
will be discussed later.)
EXPERIMENT #6 No Interaction Amongst Tracts
The importance of the racial composition in neighboring tracts
in the determination of eventual patterns was tested in this experi-
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ment. Households no longer consider the composition in adjacent
tracts; choosers act only on the per cent black of the tract in
question. Each tract is isolated from changes in neighboring tracts.
Otherwise, this experiment is identical to the preceeding one.
This change had a considerable impact on the resulting patterns,
especially in a few tracts. For example, tract 11 remains predominate-
ly white, whereas in the previous experiment tract 11 was almost all
black in five years. Clearly, the transition in tract 11 is driven
by its proximity to major concentrationsof black population. Unlike
the previous experiments, prices tended to be higher in black tracts
than in white tracts. The reason is obvious: whites no longer panic
when transition takes place in a neighboring tract; they ignore changes
in the next tract. Likewise, blacks are less willing to enter white
tracts which are contiguous to black tracts. As a result, forces for
transition in the border tracts are greatly reduced and the ghetto is
confined. This confinement raises prices in black tracts since the
black population is still growing at a substantial rate. At the same
time, white tractsin which all the new construction is concentrated,
experience an oversupply of units and prices are low.
EXPERIMENT #7 Color Blind Households
This experiment tests the behavior of the model if blacks and
whites did not consider race in their housing decisions. This was done
by making f4%) identically one for both races. All other features are
the same as Experiment #5- As might be expected, blacks soon enter
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all tracts and whites enter black areas. Whether or not housholds
ever really behave in this manner, such a pattern should result
given this preference pattern.
EXPERIMENT #8 Stability of Integrated Housing
The experiment also examines an unlikely situation. Controlling
for income, blacks and whites are distributed uniformly: 10% of upper
income residents in each tract are black; 25% of all middle income
residents; and 50% of all lower income residents in each tract are
black. Preferences, were the same as in Experiment #2. There were
no total population changes and no new construction.
The initial pattern of integration quickly begins to break down.
After five years, four tracts are clearly moving to the formation of
a ghetto. In nine other tracts there is a steady decrease in the
per cent black. However, in one tract (15), the eventual outcome was
still uncertain after all twenty time periods. After 10 years (time
period 20) the tract was 24% black; initially it was 23% black. At
first the per cent dropped, since the traet was as attractive to whites
as other tracts of medium quality. However, during the first eight
years the black population is busy concentrating itself in the neigh-
boring tracts of low quality (11,12, and 16). This adjacent concentration
made tract 15 more appealing to blacks. As a result the per cent black
rose from 9% to 24% in the last two years. Although it is dangerous
to predict the final outcome, it appears that tract 15 has entered
upon an inevitable path of transition.
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EXPERIMENTS #9 and #10 Different Initial Population
The only difference between these experiments and the first
two is that the initial population distributions have been changed.
In the first time period blacks account for less than 10% of the total
population, though the growth remains at the high level described in
Experiment #1. (The figure on the next page describes the initial
pattern of race.)
Generally, the behavior is quite similar to the behavior in the
first two experiments. One unique feature appears however: the
vacancy rate in black tracts oscillates, with a period of about seven
years. The explanation of this phenomenon is complicated and depends
greatly on the transition process. Initially, the black population
is concentrated in tract 16, with a few blacks in tract 12. In the
first few time periods, the black population is directed almost ex-
clusively at tract 12, which changes from 17% to 531 black in one year.
A small number makes an initial incursion into tract 15 at the same
time. The white flight from tracts 12 and 15 makes more units
available than is necessary to meet the needs of the steadily growing
black population. Hence vacancies, or unsold unitsbegin to rise in
black areass as in tract 16 at time period 2. However, the oppor-
tunities in tract 12 and 15 are soon filled as space in black areas
is in high demand; vacancies fall to zero in tract 16 in the next
year. However, by the third year of the simulation two more trots
have experienced significant incursion (8 and I). Once again the
the swift white reaction brings many units to market and vacancies
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begin appearing (tract 16, time period 8). By time period 13
the blacks have just filled the tracts from which whites have fled.
At this point a ghetto is clearly defined; it consists of tracts
8,11,12,15, and 16. There are no evenly mixed tracts; no tract is
more than 6% and less than 94% black.
Having filled up the ghetto, the next year (time period 15)
blacks make significant incursion into three more tracts(4,7, and 14),
all becoming more than 10% black. Transition has now begun in ernest
in these three tracts. For a third time, whites leaving transition
areas loosen the housing market for blacks. As blacks pour into these
transition tracts vacancies return to black areas.
The diagram on the next page depicts the expansion of the ghetto.
The ghetto expandsin discreet jumps, as groups of tracts go through
transition at the same time. Following each expansion is a period of
consolidation, when the transition tracts meet the needsof the growing
population. Discontinuities in the rate of ghetto expansion did not
appear in earlier runs because tracts entered transition individually
and not in groups. In this experiment the transitions seemed to be in
phase with each other. Such discontinuities are not likely to have a
broad effect on markets in real cities. Such jumps in the size of the
ghetto are probably of the size of city blocks; such a small unit will
not likely affect the market. Moreover, the small size means that
there will be many small bursts of expansion and therefore a greater
chance for the bursts to be out of phase.
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4.3 Some Conclusions
These experiments should be viewed only as preliminary investi-
gations. Many more simulations need to be made to test the sensi-
tivity of the model to all of its parameters and functions. However,
some tentative conclusions are indicated by the results of the first
few experiments.
First, the model is able to portray the time dynamics of racial
transition. The concensus of students of transition is that the
per cent black in a tract as a function of time is an S-curves rising
slowly at first, but accelerating, and eventually slowing down as
the percenatge approaches 100o. In the experiments transition always
took this form.
Secondly, the behavior of prices is sensitive to changes in
preferences. As the first two experiments indicate, slight changes
in preferences can significantly affect the price of housing in both
black and white areas; either blacks or whites can pay more. However,
in all the experiments, prices were lower in tracts while they were
undergoing transition. It seems that the contradictions of the empir-
ia
cal studies may be an actual reflection of reality: slight differ-
ences in conditions and attitudes can greatly affect market values;
market values will most likely move differently in differnt areas.
Thirdly, most of the experiments display a phenomenon which
could be defined as tipping. The tipping point may be defined as
as the per cent black at which the neighborhood'sconversion to
100% black becomes clearly inevitable. In experiments #4 and #5
a threshold effect appears to be presents with only a slight change
in preferences the eventual racial composition of tract 14 is
completely altered. In one experiment the tract crossed a threshold
which carried itto an all-black population; in the other this threshold
was not crossed. The threshold may be viewed as the tipping points
in one experiment tract 14 tipped; in the other it did not tip.
Furthermore, the experiments indicate that the tipping point is quite
low; no tract reached 10% black without beginning the process of
racial transition. (The only exception is the experiment where house-
holds had no racial preferences.) Though its value is low, the precise
value of the tipping point will depend heavily on the particular circum-
stances, such as the rates of population growth and the preferences
of each racial group.
And fourthly, in all the experiments, except the color-blind
experiment, there was a definite tendency for tractsto move one way
or the other. There were no stable patterns of integration, though
it did take tract 15 in experiment #8 the full 10 years to determine
its eventual color. This affirms the hypothesis of Schelling; the
system has imbedded within it forces favoring segregation. However,
further investigation with widely ranging sets of preferences are
needed before definitive conclusions may be drawn.
Despite its limitations, the experiments indicate that the
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model does capture some of the important systemic features of
racial transition. Certainly, such a simple model cannot predict
what will happen in a particular neighborhood, but it can provide
important insights into how racial transition takes place.
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APPENDIX - The role of the Utility Function
In two separate instances, the model requires functions of the
utility computation: first, the rate of racially motivated movement
depends on utility; and second, the likelihood of moving to a tract
depends on the utility of the tract. The difficulty is that utility,
with its vague units, is normally considered to be an ordinal scale:
utilities may be ranked, but it is impossible to attach meaning to
the numerical differences between levels of utility. In classical
microeconomics this is not a serious problem, because ordinal utilities
appear in optimization analysis: maximize utilitysubject to various
constraints. In this role ordinal utilities are sufficient.
However, the actors in this model do not maximize utility and
many movers, in fact, make sub-optimal choices: they choose a tract
which does not maximize their utility. The model maps the computed
utilities of the various alternatives into probabilities. As such
utilities play only an intermediate role. Utility is defined as a
function of the race and income of the household and three features
of the housing in the tract: the quantity of housing servicce avail-
able, the price of one unit of housing service, and the racial com-
position of the tract. Formally, U = f(R,Y,T). The likelihood of
a move is defined as a function of the utility: L = H(U). Combining
these expressions:
L = H(U) = H(f(R,Y,T)) = G(R,Y,T)
where G = H(f)
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Thus the model defines the likelihood of a move as a function of
the race and income of the mover and of the features of the tract.
The utility function could have been by-passed; it could have com-
puted likelihoods from a function which is represented here as
G(R,Y,T). As was seen in Chapter 4, peculiarities in the utility
function may easily be offset by an appropriate form of H(U). Use
of the utility function does entail one restriction: alternatives
of equal utility must be equally likely. If the concept of ordinal
utilities is accepted, then this restriction must also be accepted.
Though the utility formulation could have been avoided, it was
included for two reasons. First, it greatly emphasizes the behavioral
approach of the model, for the utility function is a concise state-
ment of the decision rule. And second, the formal structure it
provides for stating decision rules eases the inclusion of new rules
or the alteration of the old ones. Changes in the rules are simply
changes in the utility function.
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APPENDIX - PROGRAM LISTING
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
11
12
13
14
15
17
18
19
20
21
212
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
35
36
37
38
39
-4 0
41
42
43
44
45
16
47
48
49
50
51
LRAID 45.3)
READ(5,2)
READ (5,5)
READ (5,5)
READ 455)
READ (5,5)
READ45v6)
READ)(5, 5)
(NJ(J) ,J=1,NT)
(WHITE4t1lI=1,r15)
(BLACK (I) ,1=1,15)
4-MOBIL (I) , I=1, 15)
(DIST (I),I=1,15)
4TLL -4I) LI,15)
(PRICE (I),I=1, 15)
READ (5,2) (N (J),J=1, NT)
READ (5,7) (SYM (K) ,K=1,5)
READ (5,3) (DMAX (K)K=1,4)
WRITE(6,3) (AL(L),L=1,NY)
I T i46.3%4DX4J el1+ NT
W RITE (6, 3) (DY (J) , J=1, NT)
DO 22 J=1,NT
DO 22 I=1,NT
22 DI (I, J) =SQERT ( (DX (I) -DX (J)
31 CONTINUE
WRITE(6,5) (BLACK(I), I=1, 15
WRITE (6, 5) (MCBLL4I) ,I=1, 15
WRITE (6,5) (DIST (I) ,I=1, 15
WRITE (6,5) (UTIL (I) , I=1, 15
WRITE (6, 5) (PPICE (I) , I=1, 15
) **2+ (DY (I) -DY (J) ) **2)
4
I)
)
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COI IN 13J4164 1 1J34 hE.R 4 16) ,HL(16 ) ,Q 416) ,FCLR461&,-AL4-3) -16
1DX ( 16) ,DY (16) ,RL (16) ,NYNT, RAT
INTEGER Wo (3,16),BO (3,16) ,WOM(3,16) ,BOM(3,16),WOC(3,16),BoC(3,16) ,
1GWO (3) ,GB0 (3) ,NLW (3) , NLB (3) , POP (16)
DIMENSION Y(3) ,P(16) ,Y BAR(16), WHITE (15) ,BLACK (15) ,DIST (15) ,U
1TIL (15),PRICE(15),VAC(16),DIJ(16,16)
R EALK(IBI1L 4154 
-
D IMFNSION D (21, 16,4) , N (16) , DMAX (4)
INTEGER A(51),SYM(5)
DATA WOM/48*0/,BOM/48*0/,NLW/3*0/,NLB/3*0/
DATA P/16*1./
1 FORMAT(3I4)
3 FORMAT(8710.3)
5 FORMAT(15F5.2)
6 FORMAT(15F5.3)
7 FOR HAT (5A 1)
NY= 3
READ(5,1) NRUNNIT
R EAD (5,1) f (WO (L,J} L=1, NY) ,J=1, NT)
READ(5,1) ((9,n(L,J),L=1,NY),J=1,NT)
R EAD(5,2-) (EW (J),J=1,NT)
READ (5,2) (GWO (L) ,L=1, NY)
REA2)41i 0B {4LL=1, NY4
READ (5,3) (RATE (L) ,L=1,NY),RAT
READ (5,3) (Y (L) ,L=1,NY)
READ(5,3) (Q(J) , J=1,NT)
READ (5,3) JAL 4 L) ,L=1, NY)
REA D (5,3) (DX (J) ,J=1,NT)
52
53
55
56
57
58
59
61
62
63
64
65
67
68
69
E 70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
7&
79
80
81
82
83
85
86
87
88
89
9 0
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
CALL STATS(WO,1BO,YBARI,POPY,VAC,0)
DO 21 J=1,NT
D41,J,14=PER4J)
D (1,J,2) =VAC(J)
D (1,J, 3)=P (J)
D (1,J,4) =YBAR (J)
21 WRIT-E(6,3)PER(J) P(J),VACJJ),YBAR(J)
DO 99 IT=1,NIT
- ALL-EC4DIJ4
CALL MOVERS(BO, BOMNLB,GBO,2,BLACK, MOPIL)
CALL MOVERS(WQ, WOMNLW,GWO, 1, WHITE, MOBIL)
CA L L CHOOSE (N LW, WCM, WOC, 1, WHITE,UTIL, DIST, Y, P, DIJ)
CALL CHaOSE NLB BOMBOC,2, BLACKUTIL,DIST, Y, PDIJ)
CALL EXCHNG (W O, WOC, WOM, NL W, 30, BOC, BOM, NL B ,P, PR ICE)
C A LSTATS(WO YBARFPOP, Y, VAr ,1)
DO 90 J=1,NT
D (IT+1, J, 1) =PER (J)
D (IT+1, J,2)=VAC (J)
D (IT+ 1,rJ, 3) =P (J)
D (IT+1,J,4) =YBAR (J)
9 CIOrNTT1LBL
99 CONTINUE
NIT=NIT+1
CALL TABLE(D,NIT,Q,NRUNNT)
CALL DISPLA(DNDMAX,A,SYM, NITNT,Q,NRUN)
NIT=NIT-1
IF(NRUN .EQ.0)GOTO 999
WRITE (6, 32)
32 FORMAT(191)
READ(5,1) ((WO(L, J),L=1, NY),J=1, NT)
DC 33 J=1 4 NT
NJ(J)=0
PfJ)=1.
DO 33 L=1,NY
W OM (LJl=C
BOM(L,J)=0
DO 34 L=1,NY
NLW (L)=0
34 NLE (L)=0
READ(5,2) (NEW (J) ,J=1,NT)
REA D (5, 2) (GWO (L) , L=1, NY)
READ(5,5) (WHITE(I),I=1,15)
READ (5.5) (BLACK (I) , I=1,15)
R EAD (5,5) (UTI L (I) , I=1, 15)
GOTO 31
999 STOP
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103
104
1
SUrRQMIBE 1OYES( YM4 NLgGR,IRRACE, MOBIL)
COMMON NJ(16),NEW(16),RATE(3),PER(16),U(16),Q(16),FOR(16),AL (3),
DX (L1) ,. DY (16) ,R (16) ,NYT RAT
DIMENSION RACE(15)
REAL. ihIL(15)
INTEGER Y (NY, NT) ,YM (NYNT) , NL (NY) ,GR (NY)
N S U1 M= 0
DO 15 L=1,NY
Tnl 1n :T=1 - NT
105
10-6-
107
18_
109
110
111
112-
113
114
115
'16-
117
118
119
120,
121
122
DO 20 L=1,NY
R=FIN (!0 BILDEL)
N=INT (R*Y (LJ))
YtL1)=Ift(L.J) +N
NSUM=NSUM+N
rCON TT NTT L
DO 40 J=1,NT
DO_0 L=NY
IF (YM (L, J) . GT. Y (L,J) ) Y M (L, J) =Y (LJ)
30 NJ (J)=N () Y (LJ)
IF ( IR. EQ. 1) NJ (J) =NJ (J) +NEW (J)
40 CONTTNUE
RETURN
END
c
78
N=INT (RATE (L) *Y (L,J))
NSU M =NS __M+---N
YM (LJ) =N
NLN1 =B14L) +GR )
DO 25 J=1,NT
flEL=1-PrT~cfPV'FDfRn
10
15
20
25 ;
123
124
125
126
127
129
. ,
131
132
(NL 4 NM, NC, IR, RACE, UTIL, DIST, Y,P, DIJ)
(16) ,-RATE(3) , PER (16) ,U (16) ,Q(16) , FOR(16) ,AL (3),
(NT) , RACE (15) ,UTIL (15) , DIST (15) , DIJ (NT, NT)
(NY ,NT) , -N(NY, NT)
133
134
135
13_6_
137
1 38
139
141f
141
12
143
145
147
149
151
152
153 S=. 1
155 RL (I) =FUNC (UTILJ (I)) *NJ (I)
156 TP (RL (T) . LT. 0) RT (T) =0
157 IF (RL (I) . LT. 0.) WRITE (6,12) RL (I) , NJ (I)
15& -50 S=SA RL4I)
159 DO 60 I=1,NT
161 60 NC (L,I) =NC (L, I) +INT (RL (I) /S*NL (L) +.5)
162 70 CONTTNII
163 DO 80 L=1,NY
61 80 NL41=Q
* 165 11 FORMAT(# 11' ,F7.2,I6)
166 12 F ORIA TX 4 2'1 El 2It6~
167 13 FORMAT(' 131,18)
168 R ETI R N
169 END
0
Q1
C
E
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SJULROUTIALE CE 003E
COMMON NJ(16), NEW
1DY (16) , DY ()f , RT, (
DIM ENS IO N Y (NY) , P
lXNT EG .l_j4NY_ NC
DO 10 L=1,NY
RO-1-J=1, NT
10 NC(L,J)=J
nn -7 T=1 v
QM= (1.-AL (L) ) *Y (L)
DO 20 I=1,NT
20 U (I) =UTLTY (Y (T) ,Q (I) ,P (I) ,AL (L) ,F) /UM
DO 40 .=1, NT
S=. 1
tC- 30-11,T
RL(I)=FrTNO(ITIL,U(I))*NJ(I)*FUNC(DISTDIJ(IJ))
TIE4LILT-aQ4 R L4t} =
IF (RL (I) . LT. 0.) WRITE (6,11) RL (I) , NJ(I)
3 40S+RL 
DO 40 I=1,NT
40tNC4(LL,)=cL) +INT (RL(4I) /S* NM(L, J)+. 5)
0
0-
E
C
SIERO UTIlNE -EXCINGj,
COMMON NJ (16) , NEW (16
1n Y ( 16 .n Y1 .I R L (161
WC, WMs N-W, B4BCEB M, N B, P , P R IC E)
),RATE (3) ,PER(16) ,U(16) ,Q(16) ,FOR(16) ,AL(3),
. N Y. N . T AT
DIMENSION P(NT) ,PRICE(15)
_I-N TEGE-R- KNLNt-,WCl NY, -NT
1BM(NYNT) NB (NY)
DO 110 J=1,NT
V=N.T 1.7(
)-,oWM (N Y, NT) , NW (NY) , B (NY, NT) , BC (IYNT)
172
17.3
1-74_
175
176
177
118
179
I0a
181
182
183 NJ (J) =0
185 10 DO 20 L=1,NY
187 IF(Z.EQ.0.)Z=1.
188 -- - X= W C f,. -J Z
20
30
35
NF=INT (X*N+. 5)
WC (LJ) =WC (L,J) -NF
W (LJ) = W ( T. ) +r (W ,)
X=B C (L, J) /Z
NF=TNT (X*N+. 5)
NB(L)=NB(L)+NF
_BC_(L,J) =BC (L,J4 -NL
B (L,J)= B (L,J) +BC (LJ)
NJ(J)=-N
DO 140 L=1.NY
-BM (LJ)
W (L ,J)=W (LJ)+WC(LJ)-WM(1,J)
4-0 j L,J)L=B (IAJ4 *13(L,J) -Ei L,J)
100 V=N/(V+.01)
P (J)=P (JP (J *FUNC (PRIR V)
IF (P (J) .LT. PMIN) P (J)=PMIN
110 CONTTNUF
RETURN
END
80
170
171
NM=0
DO 5 L=1,NY
BA=i NEARR_(1,J)_kBM4L J4
5 NC=NC+WC (L, J) +BC (L, J)
N=N C-N M.IJ
189
190
191
-19-2
193
194
195
19-6-
197
1&
199
20Q
201
10-2-
203
204
205
206-
207
208
300
301
302
101
304
3&05-
306
_107
308
310
3111
312
314
315
316
__3117
318
320
32-1
322
121
324
325
SllBRXGJTI R XPXKCT _(LII)
COMMON NJ(16) ,NEW(16) ,PATE(3) ,PER(16),U(16) ,Q(16),FOR(16) ,AL(3),
1DX ( 16) , DY (1 6) , RTL (16) NTM
DIMENSI)N DIJ (NTNT)
_D0CAI0_3=1, NT
C=PER (J) -FOR (J)
DO 5 I=1,5
Y=T* +P R( -__
5
10
IF(X.GT. 1.) X=1.
la(Y - LT- - =O -
S=S+ (6-I) /30. *X
FADR4J =SA.5*2PR 4)
DO 30 J=1,NT
S=O.
Q 20 T=1,NT
IF (DIJ (I ,J) .GT. 1.2) GOTO 20
XS=S+i
S=S+PER (I)
20 CONTTNIM
IF (FOR (J) . LT. S/NS) FOR (J) =. 1*
F4F0X4JIR_(,I) G)T.__%_YFORj4J} =1.
IF (FOR (J) . LT. 0. ) FOR (J) =0.
30 cONWTITNiUL
RETURN
END
(9.*FOR (J) +S/NS)
81
32L FUINCTIDX01, FLUNC{FX)
327 DIMENSION F(15)
8~T TFY-.TT,?_(1))MT1-1,
329 DC 10 I=1,12
33 El-l-)-I4L-*+*F(2)) GOTO 20
331 10 CONTINUE
333 20 FUNC=F (I+3) + (X-F(1) -I*F(2) ) *(F (1+3) -F (I+2) )/F(2)
3-34 RPTjRNtb
335 100 FUNC=F(3)+(X-F(1))*(F(4)-F(3))/F(2)
Ri R E1ITN
337 END
U 
_
C
G)
C
0 --- - - _ -- - -- -
eC
82
u.e-um..-wem.
FUNCTION J'TLTY (YQPAL,F
X=Y-Q*P
T (Y . T-' 0 . ) T=O.
UTLTY=X**AL*Q** (1.-AL) *F
RETURN
END
C
83
3138
339
341
342-
343
tp
:3
2/f)Rtla)VA- 0Z OTT
M(rN+ fi') dOd=Z Z
W)(i dUd 8Z
(raa~tp}/A( (r) a v1-iI- ZZ
X+Z=Z OL EZ2
x1 I )A
0= ( ',I)Ott(o *Wl*(r J 1) o9Ao1 6L Z
______AxI'L='I CL OG LL Z
L~ ~ L 9z
IN*L=P CZ Oa CLZ
(lNdadA (LI 7N) A' (!Nr118vIA I9SRINIL L
~( L a7{1Nl LL-
(1)'I (9L)H~ (90 (0 1 ( 0dgd* ) a V'*(9 ) a (9L)rNNOWJWO0D OL
SUE ROUTIKDISPLA(D, NDMA X,
DIMENSICN D(NITNT,4) , N(NT)
TNT RCPrR SYM (5) A (51)
A, SYM, NIT, N T, Q, NR UN)
,DMAX(4) ,Q(NT)
233
234
235
236
237
218
239
240
1
3
6 PnRMAT(
6X,'0',49X,F4.2,5X,#VACANCY RATE - "V"l/
£1,%,'914.2,5xPRIC! - "!
6X,'O',47XF7.0,4X,'MEAN INCOME - "Y')
1+AL, 'TTM . LkACK VACACIES PRICE INCOKE')
DO 60 J=1,NT
TF(N(J).,0.0) T 70....
WRITE(6,1)N(J),N(J),Q(N(J)),NRUN
-- RI-TK(6-,5L- A1 K),-,
WRITE(6,3)
WRITXE4&
DO 50 IT=1,NIT
TTP=TT-1
TR=ITR
DO 10 - I=1,5L
10 A(I)=SYM(5)
M=INT(D(IT,N(J) ,K)
TF( M-.T -fl2anTn ?0
/DMAX(K)*50.+.5) +1
241
242
2JLL4244
246
247
248
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
262
263
264
265
266
268
269
270
2
272
273
A(M)=SYM(K)
40 CONTIXU -
WRITE (6,2) (A
45 CONTINI1h
50 CONTINUE
WRITE (6 -3)A
274 60 CONTINUE
275 RETRND
276 END
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1 FORMAT('1TIME PATH OF CHARACTERISTICS OF TRACT NO.',12,
15L- '--- 2L6105 'RUN NO.fi,13/ )
2 FORMAT(5X,'.' ,51A1,' .' ,23XI3,5XF4.2,7X,F4.2,5XF4.2, 3X,7.0)
4 FORMAT (1H+,' T=' ,I2)
9 PORMAT (6Y.' .01-YLL.P.2..Y.'% RT.ACK - i
A (M) =SY 1 (K)
20 CONTITU
WRITE (6,2) (A (I) ,I=1,51) ,ITR, (D(IT, N (J) ,K),K=1, 4)
TF(TR/5..EQ.TNT(TR/5))WRITTE (6,14) ITR
IF(IT.EQ.NIT)GOTO 45
30 A(I)=SYM(5)
D040_KIK=14
K=5-KK
DD= (-D ,IT, 4 K)+ D41T+1,4J-) ,K) )/2.
M=INT (DD/D MAX (K) *50. +. 5) +1
T r .aT-'511r nTnr' LLO
(I) , I= 1, 5 1)
SJLBROKIJTINE TABLr(D, NITQ,NRUN, N T)
278 DIMENSION D (NTT, NT,4) ,Q(NT)
280 2 FOPMAT('+', 9X,4('%=',F4.2,8X)/
- - - 0$.i4-V='1F4-2,8X)/
2 10X,4('P=',,F4.2,8X)/
- 1lC4A4P('=' 4E&.0-,6 X) }~
281 4 FORMAT (7X, 4 (12, 12X))
282 5 PFRnNAT(19TTN N.InT?)
283 6 FOPMAT(10X,4('Q=',F6.0,6X))
- 2& 7 FnM.AT~ee
285 WRITE (6,5) NRIUN
E an n 70TT=1,NIT
287 ITR=IT-1
288 WRTTE(6, 1) TTR
289 DO 10 L=1,4
-291 L1=A*4al-+f
291 L2=L1+3
E 292 LEK4A{J4J=L 12)
293 WRITE (6,2) ((D (IT,J,K),J=L1,L2) ,K= 1,4)
794 TF (TT FO.-1) WRTTR (6,6)dQ (J) , 3= 2 1
295 WRITE(6,7)
29&1 CGRIIP?
297 20 WRITE(6,7)
299 ETIIRN
299 E ND
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NOTES
1A short sampling of the many studies of attitudes about race:
Chester L. Hunt, "Negro-White Perceptions of Inter-racial Housing,"
Journal of Social Issues, XV(October, 1959), 24-29; Arnold Rose,
"Inconsistencies in Attitudes toward Negro . Housing," VII
(Spring, 1961), 286-292; Paul B. Sheatsley, "White Attitudes
Toward the Negro," Daedalus, XCV(Winter, 1966), 217-238.
2Karl and Alma Taeuber, Negroes in Cities: Residential Segregation
and Neighborhood Change(Chicago, 1965). See also: Morton Grodzins,
"Metropolitan Segregation", Scientific American, CXCVII(October,
1957), 33-41.
3Taueber and Tauber.
4Richard Morrill, "The Negro Ghetto: Problems and Alternatives,"
Geographic Review, LV(July, 1965), 350. A slightly different
version has also been published: "A Geographic Perspective on
the Black Ghetto," in Geography of the Ghetto, ed. Harold Rose,
(DeKalb IL, 1972).
5 Ch. R. Hansell and W. A. V. Clark, "The Expansion of the Negro Ghetto
in Milwaukee, Tijdschrift Voor Econ. En Soc. Geografie,
(Sept./Oct., 1970).
6Linton Freeman and Morris Sunshine, Patterns of Residential Segre-
gation, (Cambridge MA, 1970).
7Kerry Vandell, "A Simulation Model of the Ghetto Expansion Process,"
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, unpublished.
Thomas C. Schelling, "Dynamic Models of Segregation," Journal of
Mathematical Sociology, 1(1971) 143-186.
A concise discussion of the quantity of housing service, known
as "q", can be found in Edgar 0. Olsen, "A Competitive Theory of the
Housing Market," American Economic Review,(September, 1969).
A more exhaustive treatment may be found in Richard F. Muth,
Cities and Housing, (Chicago, 1969).
10This is an adaptation of the approach used by David Birch and others
in The New Haven Laboratory_ a Testbed for Planning, 1973, V-35.
A utility function of very similar form is used by J. Fereira and
D. Carlton, "Simulation and Analysis of Three Hybrid Housing
Allowance Payment Formulas," Report to Abt Associates and HUD,
January, 1975.
87
12Scores of articles have been written on market values and race
and there are many contradictory findings. Perhaps the most
famous study is Luigi Laurenti, Property Values and Race: Studies
in Seven Cities, (Berkeley,1960). Some other views: Anthony
Downs,"An Economic Analysis of Property Values and Race (Laurenti),"
Land Economics, XXXVI (May, 1960), 181-1881 Martin J. Bailey,
"Effects of Race and Other Dempgraphic Factors on the Values of
Single Family Homes," Land Economics, XLII (May, 1966), 215-220
E. F. Shietinger, "Race and Residential Market Values in Chicago,"
Land Economics, XXX(Nov., 1954), 301-308; Alfred N. Page, "Race
and Property Values," The Appraisal Journal, XXXVI(July, 1968),
334-342; and Charles L. Osenbaugh, "Integrated Housing and Value,"
The Appraisal Journal, XXXV (July, 1967), 17-20.
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